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What follows will be part argument and partly an exercise in attending to concepts. The first 
section will attempt to say something about Gandhi’s concept of satyagraha, the second section 
will provide an outline of open animal rescue, and the final section will consider what we gain 
from associating the latter with the former. (A move which is familiar in some animal rights 
circles.) All three sections will also include a certain amount of ‘thinking out loud’. 
 
I. Satyagraha 
Gandhi remains a key figure in the development of the concept of civil disobedience. However, 
he referred frequently to a rather different concept, satyagraha a conjunction of Gujurati terms 
that may be translated into English as ‘truth-force’ or ‘love-force’. (Satya can mean truth or love 
or both but it is, above all, that which endures). His appeal to satyagraha represented the type of 
protest for which he served as a figurehead, as a spiritualized practice. Civil disobedience, in 
turn, was taken to be a branch of satyagraha, and so too was non-compliance. (Roughly, if I fail 
to buy a TV license because I disapprove of the emblems on the license then I am engaging in 
non-compliance. But if I then go out into the street and, in an otherwise peaceful manner, burn 
my old license I am engaging in civil disobedience.) 
                                                          
1 Paper presented at the ‘Defending non-human animals’ panel, Society for Applied Philosophy 
Conference, University of Zurich, June 2013. 
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 This neat two-branch understanding of satyagraha, which figures repeatedly in Gandhi’s 
journalistic writings and letters, i.e. in the greater bulk of his texts, does not, however, give us the 
whole picture. Satyagraha was also used, both in his journalistic writings and in his 
autobiography, to describe the actions which involved resisting family pressure and (in Hind 
Swaraj and his commentary upon the Bhagavad Gita) ‘Satyagraha’ was used as a synonym for 
spiritualized struggle of any sort. And this poses something of a problem. Do we really want to 
have anything to do with language which suggests that there can be a ‘spiritual’ dimension to 
political action or to human life as a whole?  
 I will suggest that there are two obvious considerations which might lead us to permit 
such a move. Firstly, talk of what is spiritual may involve no commitment to the supernatural. 
Indeed, it is often one of the motivations behind such talk that it takes the place of talk about the 
religious (which is generally related to imagery that overstrips naturalistic bounds). Talk which 
implies that protest has a spiritual dimension may then be no more offensive than 
Wittgensteinian talk about ‘an attitude towards a soul’. Secondly, at least some political activists 
who are involved in the ecology and animal rights movements do regard their actions as having a 
spiritual dimension or would accept such a view if they were ever to be asked about this matter 
(indeed, within the ecology movement Dave Foreman has criticized the idea of civil 
disobedience precisely because he takes its practitioners to be preoccupied with spiritual practice 
and personal growth). This opens up the possibility of providing some manner of response-
dependent account of what we mean by saying that protest has a spiritual dimension. Perhaps we 
may simply be making a claim about how such protest would be regarded by a particular kind of 
authoritative participant or audience.  
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 Even so, nothing that I have to offer will disarm the determined opponent of such 
language. And so, a background dispute about this matter remains open. To try and avoid such a 
dispute being conducted upon the basis of a misunderstanding I will attempt, briefly, to clarify 
what I am and am not interested in exploring. I am interested in an issue of conceptual space. 
Satyagraha occupies a certain conceptual territory and, even if we happened to dislike the term, 
perhaps we would still need a concept that performs at least some of the same work. Conversely, 
I am not interested in suggesting that the concept of satyagraha can come to play a role which is 
already played, far more effectively, more frequently and more publicly by the concept of civil 
disobedience. You, me and everyone we know understand that claims of civil disobedience are 
claims of special standing, they are claims of entitlement to tolerant response. By contrast, 
except in India and perhaps one or two other countries, saryagraha is an ‘insiders’ term, it is 
used only by those who are ‘in the know’, e.g. by those who are familiar with the relevant 
literature. Nonetheless, activists often fall within this group and when they claim or are told that 
a protest is akin to satyagraha this may help to shape their view of the protest in question, and 
perhaps it may do so in an illuminating manner.  
 But it will only do so if the concept of satyagraha is sufficiently determinate to be 
informative. And here it may be charged that this is not the case. There is, after all, a rather large 
problem of ambiguity. Nathuram Godse, Gandhi’s assassin and also now something of a cult 
figure for some radicalized Hindus, notoriously argued that satyagraha meant whatever Gandhi 
wanted it to mean and that nobody else could pin it down. And here it may be conceded that 
Gandhi was indeed vague and imprecise and that this was a fault which he did not always 
tolerate in others. But this need not lead us to overlook the dominant sense of the concept, one 
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which associates a type of action with ahimsa, thereby with spirituality and more precisely with 
non-violence and, in Gandhi’s revised sense of ahimsa, with a readiness for sacrifice. 
 Does this still retain a certain ambiguity? Up to a point yes. But here we may defend such 
ambiguity in more general terms as a matter of preserving the ‘open texture’ of at least some 
moral and political concepts. Openness of texture allows that there is always more to be said, and 
more to be learned, a point about such concepts which is familiar from Derrida, from Iris 
Murdoch, from Bernard Williams and from more than one philosophical tradition. What is 
needful is only that a concept be sufficiently determinate to perform a useful role and with regard 
to satyagraha this seems to be the case. If I were to suggest for example, that a particular action 
of φ-ing is an instance of satyagraha, I would presumably be suggesting that it has distinctive 
features which mark it out as different from sabotage or from actions which are carried out in a 
spirit of hatred, or which are carried out under the cover of darkness and without appeal to the 
conscience of the other. In line with this open rescue may be a candidate for being satyagraha-
like while covert rescue (of the sort associated with the Animal Liberation Front) is not. 
 
II.  Open Rescue  
By ‘open rescue’ I mean the illegal (or apparently illegal) removal of animals, often laying hens 
(for reasons of portability), from private property (e.g. sheds), where such removal and its 
aftermath deliberately makes the action (and the identity of some participants) available for 
public scrutiny.  While the boundaries between such open rescue and covert rescue are not 
absolute because open rescue is not comprehensively open and covert rescue is not 
comprehensively secret, nonetheless, open rescue is open in the sense that the media and/or 
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authorities and/or animal owners are alerted during or after the rescue and some or all 
participants make no attempt to disguise their identities. Masks may sometimes be worn while 
rescuers are in chicken sheds, but this is often only a temporary measure, for health reasons 
rather than as a means of identity concealment. Identity disclosure is normal and arrest is a 
familiar outcome.  
Unless you depart from Gandhi and adhere to the anthropocentric claim that there can 
only be civil disobedience over matters that concern human interests (a point suggested by John 
Rawls but rejected even by various Rawlsians), or unless you again depart from Gandhi and hold 
that there can only be civil disobedience when the direct target is the state rather than a private 
corporation (the view of civil disobedience associated with the pre-Rawlsian account of Hugo 
Bedau) there seems to be no good reason to reject the claim that open rescue, as described above, 
really is civil disobedience. What I have in mind is, in effect, the paradigmatic form of open 
rescue pioneered during the 1990s by Animal Liberation Victoria, practiced by a variety of 
organizations in Australia and New Zealand, associated with the prominent animal rights activist 
Patty Mark, and transplanted (with varying degrees of success, and more often failure, to North 
America and Europe) from 1999 onwards. 
In the decade following an initial rescue at Alpine Farm, the practice of open rescue was 
refined and given some roots by appeal to Gandhi, to civil disobedience, and, from time to time, 
by appeal to satyagraha. According to Mark, ‘Openrescue is an act of peaceful civil 
disobedience that involves breaking laws in order to give aid and rescue to individuals who are 
neglected and in peril. It is also all about opening - whether it's a door, a gate, a cage or a 
mindset.’ Here we have, similarly to Gandhi, a combined emphasis both upon rescue and upon 
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the transformative freeing of the political agent themselves (a step in the direction of Gandhian 
Swaraj). ‘The other imperative is innocent lives are at risk, individuals who are defenseless or 
unable to help themselves. To be an Openrescue activist one's passion for justice and non-
violence must override fear. Fear of breaking unjust “laws” and the consequences to oneself that 
may follow. Though Openrescue may involve incarceration, there is an unparalleled sense of 
freedom when one steps up to help someone else who is imprisoned, tormented, tortured, abused, 
sick or dying.’2  
 
III. Some Qualifications 
But why, when we have the concept of civil disobedience ready-to-hand, would we want to, even 
if only sometimes and in very specific contexts, think of open rescue, and perhaps also some 
other protests in the light of the concept of satyagraha? One obvious reason is that it may 
sometimes not be enough to appeal to a protest as civil disobedience. In other words, drawing a 
satyagraha/civil disobedience contrast allows us to separate out a more demanding Gandhian 
protest from civil disobedience in general. The requirements for the latter may then be 
understood as significantly less stringent (perhaps even some instances of covert rescue may 
qualify). However, this can only be done at the expense of sacrificing Gandhi’s own two-branch 
approach which makes all genuine instances of civil disobedience automatically instances of 
satyagraha. Instead, we might identify those cases of civil disobedience which are akin to 
satyagraha and those which are not.  
                                                          
2
 Patty Mark, ‘The Ones Left Behind: Openrescue,’ http://www.alv.org.au/rescueteam.php.  
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 Elsewhere, I have advanced a view of civil disobedience which runs broadly along these 
lines, an account which stresses that protests do not have to be idealized in order to qualify. And 
this is not altogether a departure from Gandhi. It is strongly continuous with a pragmatic strand 
of his thought. At times, there is a doubling of his discourse when he associates civil 
disobedience primarily with the requirement that dissent must exhibit ‘civility’. Such an appeal is 
very different from an appeal to spiritual discipline. Civil disobedience may then be understood 
as action which is expressive of a special virtue of civility (which to me still looks too 
demanding) or else as action which remains within the bounds of a number of basic civil norms. 
(An altogether less demanding option.)  
 Another side of the same coin is that, at least sometimes, we will want to describe an 
action as one which expresses something closer to the highest possible standards of consideration 
for others. Perhaps, in cases such as open rescue, an appeal to satyagraha could perform this task 
in ways that are in fact more effective than an appeal to civil disobedience alone. And if we do 
not have satyagraha to fall back upon, we may still want to have a concept which occupies this 
role or which (figuratively) occupies the same conceptual space, a concept which helps us to 
identify what sits beyond civil disobedience in a particularly admirable way. One point in favour 
of allowing satyagraha to play precisely this role is that we can readily separate out civil 
disobedience and satyagraha in a way which does not seem to leave either normatively 
impoverished. An agent, who by φ-ing engages in civil disobedience or satyagraha is entitled to 
tolerant response in one case and actual admiration in the other. By contrast, the same is not true 
with regard to an agent whose action of φ-ing is considered under a description of ‘direct action’. 
The latter is the kind of thing that both political saints and fascists might engage in, to promote 
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their respective causes. Accordingly, an inclination towards tolerant response or admiration does 
not go automatically with regarding acting in this way. 
 Even so, two considerations, when they combine, might lead us to wonder whether open 
rescue really is akin to satyagraha in quite the sense that Gandhi had in mind. Firstly, for 
Gandhi, there was no such thing as satyagraha in an unjust cause. The term denoted the power of 
truth, a requirement which seems to fit with satyagraha but which we might hesitate to apply to 
civil disobedience. (We would not, after all, want a claim of civil disobedience to be rejected by 
the courts simply because a judge did not like the cause we happened to be promoting.) 
Secondly, as noted at the outset, Gandhi chose the term ‘satyagraha’ precisely because the 
concept of satya connects truth and love. And this may be a connection too far. My point here is 
not that Gandhi was wrong to suggest that the concept of love can be politicized in various ways 
(Plato, Aristotle, Tolstoy and Hannah Arendt, have all made the same, plausible, claim). Rather, 
my point is that it is too much of a stretch to politicize love in quite the way that Gandhi 
attempted, a way which requires us to love agents who in some cases may simply not be 
deserving of such a response. To love such agents would then not be to align ourselves with truth 
but with a delusion about their merits. In line with this, perhaps we may credit open rescuers 
with incredulity at the cruelty of humans, or anger at the callous actions of others (i.e. emotions 
which register disapproval) but crediting them with love for their enemies is an altogether 
different matter. 
 Yet, this may not be decisive. Here we should perhaps reflect upon the limitedness of the 
requirements for love in the relevant sense. Effectively, what Gandhi had in mind by talking of 
‘love-force’ was a strengthened version of ahimsa with overtones of an extended version of 
Pauline agape. Love of this sort may reduce to a strong combination of compassion and 
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benevolence. And whether or not we regard this as love, in any proper sense, it was something 
that was well within the reach of some of Gandhi’s supporters and may similarly be within the 
reach of those who engage in open rescue. Or, more cautiously, it may be within the reach of 
open rescuers to much the same extent as it was within the reach of those agents who were once 
described by Gandhi as satiagrahis. And this may, again, lead us to think more favourably of the 
open-rescue/satyagraha connection. 
